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Section One: Legislative Professionalism in Context 
INTRODUCTION: 
To even the most armature observer of American politics one dichotomy will seem very 
familiar: Democrats believe the government to be a positive force for good while Republicans 
are adamant in their constant skepticism of the ability of government to accomplish much of 
anything. “Too much government,” “too many regulations,” and “too many taxes” are phrases all 
common in Republican speeches, campaigns, and policy proposals. Ever since New Deal 
programs of the 1930s mostly Keynesian Democrats have transformed the role of the federal 
government, involving it in almost every sector of economic life in American. This transition left 
an impact on state and local governments as well.  Increasing demands on states came as 
Congress funneled money into their legislatures through grants, stimulus projects and new 
federally mandated programs.  States legislatures, lacking the same institutions and resources as 
congress, struggled to keep up with the new demands put on them. By the end of the 1950s, 
Legislatures continued to look amateurish in comparison to Congress - legislators on the state 
level were understaffed, underpaid, and were only in session a few months per year.  
Political scientist Alexander Heard described the legislature of the mid-twentieth century 
as institutionally “poorly organized; technically ill-equipped; functioning with inadequate time, 
staff, and space; and operating with outmoded procedures and committee systems”1 Additionally 
legislators were poorly compensated for their time spent in the legislatures, and consequently 
approximately 97% of legislators considered themselves something other than a “full-time 
                                                     
1 Alan Rosenthal, Engines of Democracy: Politics & Policymaking in State Legislatures, (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), 183-184 
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legislator.”2  This all changed starting in the mid-1960s as legislatures began to fashion 
themselves in a manner similar to Congress.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which ideology and partisanship can 
be utilized to explain legislative professionalism. Most scholars remain focused on economic 
factors that influence professionalization. While these factors remain important, it is my assertion 
that ideological influences cannot be completely dismissed and need to be examined further. To 
demonstrate this point, I will first provide an over of the professionalization movement as well as 
cover some of the major scholarship that has been produced on this topic over the past forty 
years. Following that I will explicate the results of survey research I conducted of Oregon 
legislators.  Lastly the survey findings are compared with previous scholarship to see the extent 
to which they comport with previous conducted research in this area. This study concludes that 
under some circumstances legislator ideology can have an impact over a State’s propensity to 
professionalize, however, that effect is often limited by the comparative wealth (GDP), of each 
state.  
LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALISM 
In 1960s, the Citizens Conference of State Legislatures (CCSL), published a book 
entitled The Sometime Governments, in which state legislatures were evaluated for how 
“functional, accountable, informed, independent and representative”3 they were and ranked 
accordingly from one to fifty. The rankings served as a “wakeup call” for many state lawmakers, 
as “no state wanted to remain ranked in the bottom half of the list or below its neighbors or 
rivals.”4 Due in part to the CCSL,  the mid-1960s through the 1980s saw a reform movement 
                                                     
2 " Legislators' Occupations in all States, 1976, 1986, 1993, 1995, 2007 (percentages)," NCLS website. http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-
elections/legisdata/legislator-occupations-national-data.aspx (fix) 
3 Outlined in more detail in Appendix A  
4 "The Sometime Governments Revisited," NCLS website. http://ncsl.typepad.com/the_thicket/2010/07/the-sometime-governments-
revisited.html 
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“sweep through the nation, with state after state moving to professionalize its legislature.”5 
Within the short span of a few decades, legislatures rebuilt themselves. Following 
recommendations from the CCSL report, several state legislatures passed reforms to increase 
time they spent on their tasks, establish or increase their professional staffs, streamlined their 
procedures, enlarge their facilities, invigorated their processes, (attend) to their ethics, disclose 
their finances, and reduce their conflicts of interests.”6  
The original report on legislative professionalism published by the CCSL created their 
own criteria of what a professional legislature should look like, and measured each state’s 
legislature against that standard. These criteria, as previously outlined, were as follows: that a 
legislature ought to be “Functional, Accountable, Informed, Independent, and Representative.” 
However, a set of recommendations also accompanied the criteria (Appendix A).   To a modern 
reader familiar with Congress, these recommendations may seem commonplace. For example 
“adequate office facilities” for legislatures is something every citizen would expect their 
legislators to have access to. This was not in the case in most state legislators of the 1960s.  
Former Oregon Governor Ted Kulongoski remembers serving in the Oregon legislature in the 
early 1970's and how few resources were available to the legislature in those days. “When I first 
started in the legislature, (legislators) didn’t have (their) own offices," Kulongoski recalls, "the 
capitol expansion in the late 1970's finally changed that."7   The Governor's statement refers to 
the 12.5 million dollar renovation in 1977 which "added further space for legislative offices, 
hearing rooms, support services, a first floor galleria, and underground parking."8 Renovations 
                                                     
5 Richard Clucas, “The Legislature,” Oregon Politics and Government: Progressives versus Conservative Populists, ed. Richard A. Clucas, et al. 
(Omaha: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 120 
6 Alan Rosenthal, “The Legislative Institution: Transformed and at Risk,” The State of the States, ed. Carl E. Van Horn, (Washington, DC: CQ 
Press, 1981) 69. It should be noted that reform movements in several states also took place in the decades previous to the issuing of the CCSL 
report. See (Squire, 2009).   
7Kolongoski, Ted. Lecture. Feb 15, 2013.  
8 Oregon Legislature Website. http://www.leg.state.or.us/capinfo/legislative_history.pdf 
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were necessary as the original building, constructed in 1938, merely consisted of the main two 
legislative chambers with very limited office space. Over time, changes to state legislatures such 
as the one outlined by Gov. Koulongoski became known among scholars as “legislative 
professionalization.” 
 While the CCSL had set out general recommendations on state legislatures could 
improve their functions, a concise definition of Professionalism had not yet been agreed upon. 
Imagine a hypothetical scenario were a researcher were attempting to compare Texas with 
California. What if Texas increased their legislative session to 8 months a year but provided no 
staffing to members, while California only held 4 month sessions but provided resources for each 
of their legislators to hire 2 staff members. Both states had adopted some of the CCSL reforms. 
Fictional California became more “functional” than Texas in regard to staffing yet less 
“functional” with shorter session lengths. In this hypothetical scenario which legislature is to be 
considered more “professionalized”? Scholars agreed that the best way to solve this problem was 
to use Congress as the standard of a professionalized legislature with which compare the relative 
level of professionalization of each state legislature. A standard definition of professionalism 
emerged.  
Professionalism Defined 
The commonly accepted general definition of “professionalism” is the movement of state 
legislatures toward the same level of organizational support as Congress. This means “providing 
(state legislatures) with adequate resources to do their jobs in a manner comparable to 
(Congress).”9 Adequate resources include, but are not limited to, “(expanded) legislative 
sessions, superior staff resources, and sufficient pay to allow members to peruse legislative 
                                                     
9 Neal D. Woods and Michael Baranowski, “Legislative Professionalism and Influence on State Agencies: The Effects of Resources and 
Careerism,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, 31(2006), 589.   
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service as their vocation”10 All of these variables are tracked by the National Conference of State 
Legislators (NCSL). The composite of these factors has lead the NCSL to group modern state 
legislatures into three categories.  Professional, semi-professional, and amateur, (sometimes also 
called "Citizen-Based"). A professional legislature as defined previously, is a body that closely 
resembles congress in that it meets full time, has full-time, proficient staff, and compensates its 
members and staff in a manner commiserate with their work load and education.11 Semi-
professional legislatures are ones in which meet some, but not all, of the qualifications being 
professional legislature. Perhaps they do have some full time staff but a legislature that only 
meets part time, or they meet annually but the legislators are not compensated as adequately as a 
professional legislature would be.  Finally, amateur legislatures are ones in which legislatures are 
barely compensated for their time, staffing is limited and rarely exists past the session, and 
sessions only last a few months a year, or in some states every other year. Most states have 
professionalized to some degree and fall into the middle category of semi-professional. These 
NCSL definitions are just a more descriptive way articulate how similar a or dissimilar a given 
state legislature is when compared to congress. While no state is close to the organizational level 
of Congress,12 these terms are quick descriptive categories scholars can used to compare one 
state to another.   
PREVIOUS SCHOLARSHIP 
One of the first scholars to track the reformation of state legislatures was Alan Rosenthal, 
considered by many academics to be the man “who reshaped legislatures.”13 Rosenthal was one 
of the first scholars to give major academic attention to the professionalization movement in state 
                                                     
10 Peverill Squire, “Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited,” State Politics and Policy Quarterly, 7(2007): 211 
11 CCSL report, (Figure 1) 
12 The Squire Index, to be discussed later, demonstrates California, the most professional state legislature, to only be 2/3rds as professional as 
Congress.  
13 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/12/nyregion/alan-rosenthal-who-reshaped-legislatures-dies-at-81.html?_r=0 (November 15, 2013.) 
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legislatures. Distinctive about Rosenthal was the ability of his work to influence state legislatures 
and instigate substantive change in the way they function. His article, “An Analysis of 
Institutional Effects: Staff Legislative Parties in Wisconsin,”14 was one of eight case studies he 
published15 examining legislative functions in various states. Rosenthal’s findings1617 were 
widely read, in particular by the state legislatures about which the articles were written. This in 
turn inspired other state legislatures to initiate their own reforms.18 The real world effect of his 
work on state legislatures is considered by many to be Rosenthal’s greatest contribution:  “His 
ability to bridge the gap between scholarship and politics (…) helped to modernize and 
strengthen state legislatures, encouraging them to become equal partners in our three-part 
government,” writes Karl Kurtz, a scholar of state legislative politics. Rosenthal was not merely 
content to research and publish scholarship about legislative professionalization – he took an 
active role in encouraging states to reform.  Being one of the “founding fathers” of the study of 
legislative professionalism, Rosenthal remains immensely important; however, Rosenthal was 
adamant that legislative professionalism only ought to focus on the legislature itself, and not the 
members which comprise it. Therefore, Rosenthal kept his research focus mainly on what he 
called “institutional professionalism.”  
Institutional Professionalism  
Institutional professionalism refers to “the improvement of legislative facilities, the 
increase in information available to the legislature, the size and variety of legislative staffs, the 
time spent at legislative work, etc.”19 These aspects are “institutional” in the sense that they have 
                                                     
14  Journal of Politics, 32 (August 1970), pp. 531-562  
15 As author and/or editor 
16 Rosenthal, Alan. “Turnover in State Legislatures," American Journal of Political Science, 27  
  (August 1974), pp. 609-616 
17 The State of State Legislatures: An Overview," Hofstra Law Review, 4 (Summer 1983), pp 1185-1204 
18  http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/alan-rosenthal-wizard-of-democracy.aspx  
(November 15, 2013.) 
19 Woods, 589.   
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only indirect influence on individual legislators and have more to do with the function of the 
legislature as a whole. The increases in length of sessions, for example, allowed the legislature 
more time to adequately consider and craft legislation on larger and more complex issues. 
Expanded facilities for office space not only provided members with a workplace but gave them 
the opportunity to hire additional staff. Increased levels of non-partisan staff, lawyers to help 
draft legislation, economists and accountants to help forecast revenues and expenditures, and 
also committee staff, assist the legislature by providing internal sources of information as well as 
streamlining the legislative process. The advent of partisan staff also helped to support the 
legislature. As with all non-partisan staff, they work to keep their legislator informed and can 
bring expert knowledge the legislators may not otherwise have access to.  With the demands of 
policy making, legislators do not have sufficient time to answer the hundreds of emails and 
phone calls they get on a weekly basis. While some of this work can be mundane, partisan staff 
play a valuable role in creating awareness around what issues are of concern to constituents as 
well as forging a relationship between the legislator and his/her constituents. Even in amateur or 
semi-professional legislatures legislators have realized that having a limited number full time 
staff in the office year round helps to compensate for members only being there part time.20 In 
addition to Institutional aspects of professionalism, Rosenthal also identified characteristics that 
could be categorized as Careerist Professionalism, or “Careerism.”  
Careerist Professionalism  
Careerism is the extent to which members consider being a legislator as their full time 
vocation.21 The division between Careerism and Institutional Professionalism is an important one 
to make. While some states have professionalized their legislatures institutionally, with expanded 
                                                     
20 Hedge (1998),115 
21 Ibid 
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facilities, sessions, and staff, the not all legislators serving in them do not consider themselves to 
be professional legislators, with careers outside of the legislature.  
Professors Karl Kurtz, Rick Farmer, Thomas Riddle, and David Hedge are notable for 
their interest in careerism of state legislators. Recent statistical data has shown a marked increase 
in the number of legislators who consider their job in the legislature to be their full time 
vocation. Karl Kurtz has authored a large amount of scholarship explaining this trend, including 
a recent article examining legislator’s perceptions of how much time they spend “on the job.”22 
Kurtz has also been active in what has been the most contentious debates concerning careerism, 
and that is the “case of term limits.” Farmer and Riddle wrote a book,23 edited by Kurtz, which 
explores the negative effects term limits have on institutional memory and consensus building 
within the legislature.24 Thad Kousser of UC San Diego also authored a book demonstrated term 
limit to have a detrimental effect on the ability of legislators to build the relationships necessary 
to effective work together. In fact, the majority of scholarship concerning careerism seems agree 
that term limits do little to accomplish their stated goal: to curb the average length of time 
legislator spend in office and prevent careerism. Kousser and Kurtz prove that regardless of term 
limits legislators on the state level rarely spend more than a few terms in a given office. Those 
who think of themselves as career legislators use the legislature as a stepping stone to higher 
office.25 The only supportive literature that can be found for term limits come in the form of 
opinion pieces in newspapers and magazines. Some of these articles are well written but they 
                                                     
22 Kurtz, Karl. T, Gary Moncrief, Richard G. Niemi, and Lynda W. Power. 2006. “Full-Time, Part-Time, and Real Time: Explaining State 
Legislators’ Perceptions of Time on the Job.” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 6:322-38. 
23 Farmer, Rick; Riddle, Thomas. “Legislative Leadership” Institutional Change in  American Politics: The Case of Term Limits, edited by 
Karl T. Kurtz, Bruce Cain, and Richard G. Niemi, 55-72. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007. 
24  Institutional Change in American Politics: The Case of Term Limits, edited by Karl T. Kurtz, Bruce Cain, and Richard G. Niemi, 55-72. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007. 
25 Kousser, Thad. Term Limits and the Dismantling of State Legislative Professionalism (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
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have no basis in scholarship and run counter to the substantive amount of research that has been 
produced on the subject. While careerism has been a much more popular topic of discussion over 
the last several decades, most scholars remain interested in the institutional changes wrought by 
professionalization.  
The general view of scholars is that the general move to greater professionalization 
within state legislatures is a good thing. With the scope of authority that states have acquired and 
the complexity of issues they deal with, it is important that the institutional structure of their 
legislatures be organized in manner more akin to Congress. All states have moved in this 
direction to some degree. To track the relative changes within each state scholars began to create 
formulas with which could measure legislative professionalism. While the NCSL blue-white-red 
representation of professionalism makes for a nice presentation, a quantifiably measurement is 
much more useful in comparing states.  These formulas, for the most part, utilized congress as 
the standard by which all states could be compared. The measurement most commonly 
referenced by scholars today is the “Squire Index.” 
Measuring Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index 
Peverill Squire, currently a professor of political science at the University of Missouri, is 
best known for the creation of the “Squire Index,” which measures the extent to which state 
legislatures are “professional” compared to Congress.  The Squire Index, created by Peverill 
Squire, utilize three variables to measure professionalization:  length of legislative session, staff 
resources, and member pay. 26 The states are ranked on a scale of zero to one, with one indicating 
that a state complete resembles Congress and zero indicating no resemblance whatsoever.  A 
brief sampling of five states will make the rankings clear.  
                                                     
26 Peverill Squire, “Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited,” State Politics and Policy Quarterly, 7(2007): 211 
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[Insert Table 1 here] 
  California, the highest ranked state in Squire’s Index, pays its legislators nearly as much 
as members of Congress with annual salaries of $116,000.27 California’s legislature meets 
annually with no limit on session length, and has an average of 8.9 staff per member. By 
contrast, New Hampshire pays its members a token $100 annually and only meets forty-five days 
a year. In between these two extremes are states such as Texas and Oregon. Both these states pay 
their legislators a modest $16,000 and $25,00028 respectively, and as of 2003 were only meeting 
on a biennial basis. Legislators in these states were provided office space and resources to high 
temporary staffs while in session. In slight disagreement with Rosenthal, Squire posits that both 
“Institutional” and “Careerist” Professionalism play a role in professionalization and therefore 
both are included calculating a state’s score on in his Index.  However Squire is clear in 
distinguishing the relationship between Institutional Professionalism and Careerist 
Professionalism – while some states have professionalized their legislatures institutionally with 
expanded sessions and staff, the legislators serving in them do not consider themselves to be 
professional legislators, with careers outside of the legislature. 29  Therefore according to Squire, 
“a professional legislature need not necessarily be a career legislature,”30 meaning that a 
legislature could be fully professionalized in its institutions but still have legislators that serve 
part time. Despite this fact, data regarding legislature vocation, as discussed earlier, has shown a 
marked increase in the number of legislators who consider their job in the legislature to be their 
full time vocation. Some legislatures continue to professionalize while others lag behind. Several 
                                                     
27 Ibid, 87 
28 Ibid, 87, figures accurate as of 2007 
29 Squire, "Measuring State Legislative Professionalism,"  215 
30 Squire, "Measuring State Legislative Professionalism,"  215 
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studies have examined trends which might explain this disparity, yet most have greatly 
undervalued ideology as a possible explanation.  
EXPLANATIONS FOR PROFESSIONLSIM 
Much of the pervious scholarship interested in professionalism has focused on state 
wealth as a leading indicator contributing to whether a state will be more or less 
professionalized.31  A modest amount of other scholarship has looked at ideology and party 
affiliation, state political culture,32 and state population. The later of these, state population, has 
been demonstrated to be nearly identical to state wealth, and is considered by most scholars to be 
synonymous with state wealth with respect to professionalism.33 Without a doubt the established 
scholarship has demonstrated the state wealth theory, (comparative GDP levels), as a solid 
explanatory framework - states with larger economies will have larger revenue bases (tax 
income), and therefore additional resources for legislative pay and staff.  When considered by 
itself, the state wealth theory fails to account for several outliers. Many states with similar sized 
economies receive vastly different professionalization scores on the Squire Index. Might 
ideological factors better explain these differences? State wealth still functions as an adequate 
explanation for professionalism, it is the contention of this paper that certain cases m can be 
better understood when considering ideological factors. 
State Wealth  
Since the majority of monetary resources of a State are derived from tax revenue, a state 
with a larger GDP will likely have a larger flow of revenue with which to work.. Of the states 
                                                     
31 Hamm, Keith; Squire, Peverill. 101 Chambers: Concress, State Legislatures, and the Future of Legislative Studies. Ohio State Unversity Press, 
Columbus Ohio. 2005. p 79 
32 Based largely on Elazar’s (1984) typology. For more see, 101 legislatures p 87-88 
33 Ibid   
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with the ten largest economies, seven of them are considered “fully professional,” with an 
average legislator salary of $52,000/year.34  In contrast, the states with the ten smallest 
economies have an average legislator pay of $11,000/year.35 Beyond increased resources from 
which to work, this trend is that a larger economy means a more diverse and complex economy. 
This explains why California, which boasts a GDP of nearly two trillion dollars, pays their 
legislators approximately $110,000/year.36 Such a salary may seem outrageously high to a 
legislator serving in the Rhode Island legislature making a meager $14,000/year.37 However, it is 
logical that legislators in states with larger economies and populations have more policy 
decisions to make, more constituents issues to deal with, and a greater diversity of interests to 
balance; therefore, they receive a larger salary and have instituted more professional mechanisms 
to deal with the workload. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 1 compares the 2003 GDP of each State with the given Squire Index rank for the 
same year.38 A plausible trend line emerges demonstrating a positive connection between state 
wealth and professionalism.  However this relationship is not perfect as several clear outliers 
emerge.  Texas had a 2003 GDP slightly higher than New York yet compensated its legislators at 
almost one-tenth the rate and additionally only holds sessions biennially; for these reasons Texas 
received a much lower score on the Squire Index despite its high GDP. Wisconsin and 
Massachusetts have considerably lower GDP than New York yet scores nearly as high on the 
Squire Index. At the same time the state of Hawaii has an only slightly higher Squire Index score 
than Texas however it has a GDP approximately 5 percent that of Texas. Meanwhile Utah, with a 
                                                     
34 Squire, State Legislatures Today: Politics Under the Domes. Ed. Gary Moncreif. Pearson Education, Inc. (2010): p 87.  
35 Ibid 
36 Ibid 
37 Ibid 
38 California is not pictured in figures one, four and five due to its exceptionally high GDP. California’s GDP and Squire Index score was 
included when calculating the trend line.   
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GDP only slightly higher than Hawaii, received one of the lowest Squire Index scores given. 
Despite the fact that many scholars accept the GDP of states as one of the largest indicators, it 
alone cannot adequately explain the discrepancy between states.  Partisanship has emerged as a 
potential explanation for this discrepancy.  
Partisanship  
The explanation from partisanship is based on the assumption that Democrats are, in 
general, more supportive of an expansion of the role of Government, whereas Republicans 
generally opposed these policies. The New Deal and Great Society programs are examples from  
the 20th Century of massive redefinitions of the role of Government in relation to the economy 
and society.  These reforms have largely been supported by Democrats. Some have asserted that 
because of this general difference between the two parties that states controlled by Democrats 
would be more likely to become professionalized due to the Democrats propensity to tax at 
higher levels and spend more money than their Republican counterparts. Yet are democrats more 
inclined to spend more than their republican counterparts? Neil Malhotra has examined 
relationship between spending levels, tax rates and professionalization.39 Neil Malhotra’s 
research refutes, to some extent, assertions of partisans as an explanation for why some 
legislatures have professionalized to a greater extent than others. Malhotra (2008) concluded that 
“professional legislators spend no more than their counterparts in unprofessional bodies,” and 
moreover “these conjectures have been based on either speculation or inattention to the fact that 
professionalism, as a strategic choice, may be a response to and not a cause of growth in the 
public sector.”40 In other words supporters of this theory have it backwards. Malhotra ruled that 
                                                     
39 Neil Malhotra, “Disentangling the Relationship between Legislative Professionalism and Government Spending,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 
33(2008): 289 
40 Malhotra (2008), 308 
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the increasing role of Government, through the creation of New Deal and Great Society 
programs, is one factor that caused of the movement toward professionalism rather than resulting 
from it. Yet is the argument from partisanship totally without evidence? Morris Fiorina published 
a preliminary paper arguing there was evidence correlating partisanship with professionalism.41   
Fiorina argues that a professional legislature favors Democratic over Republican 
politicians in two ways. First, being a legislator as a full-time occupation is more attractive to a 
Democrat than to a Republican, and second, policy positions of Democrats tend to favor 
professionalization more so that Republican policy positions.  To provide evidence for these 
assertions Fiorina looks at two well researched aspects of professionalization: the comparative 
length of the legislative session in each state and the comparative salaries of legislators. In the 
state of Ohio, Fiorina notes, the Republicans held the majority of seats in the House every year42 
from 1946 until 1972 when a thirteen point increase on the Democratic side gave them the 
majority. What explained this sudden shift in fortunes for the Democrats? Fiorina highlights the 
1967 change in the Ohio state constitution to allow annual sessions. With this move, Ohio voters 
effectively doubled the number of days the legislature would meet in a two year period “from 
315 days in the 1967 biennial session, (…) to 717 days in the 1971-72 annual sessions.”43   
Fiorina admits an individual cases can be anecdotal as concrete evidence of a trend. 
When data from 31 states is aggregated from 1946-1990, the number of days in session is found 
to have only marginal influence on Democratic success over time.  However, Fiorina’s 
calculations did indicate a statistically minor relationship between legislative salaries and 
Democratic success. For every $10,000 increase in real biennial compensation the Democrats 
                                                     
41 Fiorina, Morris P. “Divide Government in the American States: A Byproduct of Legislative Professionalism?” American Political Science 
Review. (2004) 88.2: 304-16   
42 Except 1958 
43 Fiorina (1994) 309 
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saw a very modest .7 percent increase in their seat share across the thirty-one state sample. 
However, it would be ridiculous to expect that a change in legislative session length or 
compensation would have an exponential net benefit for democrats. A re-examination of the 
Squire Index data with consideration given to the political composition of each state legislature 
will shed further light on the influence of partisanship on professionalism.  
Section Two: Research Methods and Results 
METHODOLOGY 
In order to establish a link between political ideology and professionalization, a survey of 
Oregon state legislature was conducted. The data presented in this paper sheds light onto the 
perceptions of legislators as to what they think of Professionalism as it pertains to their 
ideological views and party affiliation.  Secondary outcomes will explore how legislators view 
session length and allocation of resources toward their own salaries, office staff, and legislative 
resources. This will establish a potential relationship between party affiliation and/or ideology 
and the tendency to move toward a more a professionalized legislature. 
Some social scientists deride case studies as the weakest form of inquiry, particularly 
when the scope is limited to a single or a few cases. These critics argue that with such a small 
data set, it is impossible to extrapolate any larger theory from such a limited sample. However, 
that critique is only valid where cases lack fairly uniform background conditions. In the study of 
state legislatures, a substantial number of similarities exist between states such that comparison 
is possible. In this regard Oregon is relevant not only because the history of the 
professionalization of Oregon’s legislature is common to that of other states, but also because it 
has such a diverse economy and political landscape.  Moreover, the work of Robert Yin has 
18 
 
demonstrated the case study to be extremely useful as a method of testing theoretical 
frameworks.   
Oregon As Case Study 
The modern Oregon economy has strong agricultural and natural resource extraction base 
in the rural areas as well as a vibrant technology and industry sector in the metropolitan hub of 
Portland. The types of issues debated in the Oregon Legislature are therefore quire diverse, and 
therefore common with mostly rural agricultural states such as those in the Midwest as well as 
states that are densely populated with large industrial economies. The diversity of relevant issues 
in Oregon creates an environment where the ideological trends can be assumed to reflect the 
larger trends influencing politics all over America today. 44 Urban residents are distinctly more 
liberal/progressive than their conservative rural counterparts. The legislators produced by such 
an environment would be dissimilar enough in their backgrounds and ideologies that any survey 
research conducted could be representative of state legislatures all across the United States. From 
the standpoint of the Squire Index Oregon is also ideally suited for case study research. As of 
2003 Oregon was ranked 25th on the Squire Index in terms of its professionalization score. Thus 
being what the NCSL would call a “semi-professional” legislature, it remains neither overly 
similar nor overly dissimilar when compared to Congress.  
The history of the professionalization of Oregon’s legislature is similar to that of many 
other states. Oregon’s most major effort to modernize its legislature was in 1967, a time when 
dozens of other states were also looking at reform. During that time the legislature "created an 
advisory committee to study and recommend reforms” and in 1968, the committee’s report was 
                                                     
44 Clucas, (2005)  
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issued and the state legislature chose to adopt some, but not all of the recommended reforms.45 46 
Similar to other states,47 initial reforms included “increased legislators’ pay, removed 
constitutional restrictions on session lengths, and hired more staff.” 48 As with many other states, 
the expanded session length and additional staff was meant to increase institutional 
professionalism by giving legislators the professional support they needed to do their jobs. The 
increase in salary worked to make the position of “legislator” somewhat more financially viable 
as permanent vocation.49 Despite these early reforms, legislators were still left without offices or 
full-time staff. To create this space renovations were necessary as the original building, 
constructed in 1938, merely consisted of the main two legislative chambers with very limited 
office space. The additional space made a huge difference as it gave each member a physical 
location within the building to house their staff, hold meetings, and work. It was not until the 
1980's that the legislature voted to allocate funds for limited staffing year round. This had the 
effect of better preserving institutional memory as staff no longer severed on a temporary basis.50 
More recent changes include the creation of annual sessions starting in 2012, allowing Oregon to 
join the all but four states who hold annual sessions.51 With the legislature holding a shortened 
one-month session in even numbered years in addition to the 6-month session held in odd 
numbered years. Additionally in 2011 the democratically controlled legislature approved modest 
increases in legislator and staff salaries. These recent reforms were not without controversy and 
debate. The survey research in this publication will help to explain ideological influences on 
these changes.  
                                                     
45 Clucas (2005), 120 
46 See Appendix A for recommended reforms. 
47 As of 1998, over 4/5th of state legislators had adopted such basic reforms. See Hedge (1998), 5 
48 Clucas (2005),  120 
49 Ibid 
50 Thad Kousser, Term Limits and the Dismantling of State Legislative Professionalism, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 53-57 
51 Hedge (1998), 116 
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One final general justification for the use of case study research is grounded in the work 
of Robert Yin (1981). Yin defines case studies as a “research strategy” which is “to be likened to 
an experiment, a history, or simulation.”52 He goes on to rightly assert that as a mode of 
experiment, case studies are utilized to test existing theories that explain a phenomenon or asses 
the validity of new explanations for that phenomenon. In relation to my own inquiry, the 
relationship between party affiliation and ideology as it relates to legislative professionalism is 
what my case study tests. The only way to test such a theory was to look at a state where reforms 
involving aspects of professionalization were occurring, and ask legislators what they thought 
about those reforms. Ideology or party affiliation can be said to have an influence on such 
outcomes if the majority of one particular party of ideological position favor certain reforms over 
others. Survey data is useful in this regard as it can identify if factors such as ideology play a role 
in why a particular legislator might favor professionalism. The outcome of such research will 
shed light on the issue of ideology and its relationship with professionalism.  
Survey Construction, Distribution, and Return Rate 
It was my hypothesis that when ideological factors are compared with responses from 
issues such as session length or legislator salaries a trend would emerge. In constructing the 
survey, I first asked legislators to identify their political party and ideological affiliation, as well 
as whether their district was “urban,” “rural,” or a “mixture” of the two. Questions were then 
formulated to ascertain legislator perceptions regarding the switch to annual sessions, current 
legislator salary and staffing levels. The answers to these questions would be compared with the 
partisan identification of the participant. (For a complete view of the survey, see Appendix D).   
                                                     
52 Yin, Robert. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Mar.,1981), pp. 59 
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Surveys were physically distributed with a pre-addressed envelope to member offices at 
the state capitol building in Salem. Included with the survey was a one page informational53 that 
informed the members of the purpose of the survey as well as the assurance that their responses 
would be anonymous. An attempt was made to distribute over ninety surveys, one to every 
legislator; however, three offices declined to participate in the survey and I could not distribute 
two due to a lack of staff present in the office. In the following weeks, I received twenty-nine 
responses to the survey leaving a return rate of 34 percent. Of the responses received, nineteen 
were from Democratic legislators while only ten were from Republicans. Considering the 
Democrats currently hold majorities in both houses this is not totally unexpected. This leaves a 
partisan participation at a rate of twenty out of fifty, (40 percent), for democrats and nine out of 
forty, (22.5 percent), for Republicans. Republicans were represented at a slightly lower 
percentage than democrats, however such return rates are not outside of the norm for survey 
research and adequate for the purposes of my analysis.  
SURVEY RESULTS 
Ideology vs. Annual Sessions 
As already mentioned, nineteen out of the twenty-nine survey participants identified as 
Democrats while ten identified as Republicans. Table two represents the survey data gathered 
from survey questions two and three and illustrates the partisan breakdown of legislature. The 
Democratic delegation was almost evenly split between identifying as liberal and moderate. Two 
Democrats chose not to identify their ideology. Conversely only one Republican identified 
themselves as moderate, while eight picked conservative. Democrats are ideologically center-left 
and represent mostly urban areas while Republicans are solidly on the right with constituents that 
                                                     
53 See Appendix C 
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live in mostly rural areas.  These results comport with trends nationally, as cities all over the 
country tend to be more ideologically liberal and strongly associated with the Democratic Party. 
Having collected data from a solid representation of ideological positions, those positions can 
now be compared with the rest of the survey data.  
[Table Two about here] 
 
Table three contrasts party affiliation, political ideology, and district composition with 
the question of Oregon’s 2011 shift to annual sessions. Party affiliation revealed a split among 
Republicans with a slight majority being against annual sessions. Ninety percent of Democrats, 
on the other hand, are largely in favor of switching to annual sessions. Of the 18 Democrats who 
approve of the change, three take the position that the sessions should be expanded even further. 
Party ideology sheds even more light on the question. Some Conservatives (37%), a majority of 
Moderates (85.7%) and Liberals (75%), feel the change to annual sessions was necessary. Those 
disapproving of the annual sessions are largely (83.3%) ideologically conservative while all three 
of those in favor of expanding the session length even further are liberal. In looking a district 
composition the only clear trend is that those in rural districts are largely opposed to annual 
sessions. Members who represent urban districts largely feel the switch to annual sessions was 
necessary with only a few outliers on each side feeling the change was “unnecessary” (one 
person,) and “didn’t go far enough” (two people). Mixed districts are also largely supportive of 
the change. It can be concluded, based on this data, that conservative members in rural districts 
are the mostly likely to be opposed to the expanded session length while liberals and moderates 
in urban regions are most likely to be supportive. Considering the survey data gathered, one 
would predict that the vote over the 2011 expansion of session length would fall upon party 
lines.   The voting record, (see figure two), from the 2010 special session of the Oregon 
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Legislature on SJR 41, which referred the decision over expanding the legislative session to 
Oregonians, completely corroborates the findings of the survey, (shown in figure three).  
[Table Three about here] 
[Figures two and three about here] 
When comparing the results of the survey data to the 2010 vote to switch to annual 
sessions in Oregon, we find near identical numbers. While it is not surprising that the survey data 
would align with the voting record, the fact that that both closely aligned with each other helps to 
provide validity to the survey data. The Oregon Senate saw a 24-6-0 vote in favor of annual 
sessions while the House approved the measure 34-24-2.54 The house vote fell almost strictly on 
party lines with only one member on each side voting against their own party. The Senate had no 
Democratic “nay” votes, while seven Republicans joined the Democrats in the affirmative. 
Combining the two chamber votes the measure received an overall 58-30-2 vote.  The survey 
data paints a very similar picture to that of the voting record, with near unanimous support from 
Democrats while the Republicans were largely split on the issue. It also gives evidence that the 
split in the Republican party on the SJR 41 can be explained though looking both at ideologically 
preference as well as district composition.  Again, conservative, rural republicans are less likely 
to support such a change while more moderate Republicans from mixed districts supportive. This 
trend continues when looking at legislator salaries.  
Ideology vs. Legislative Salaries 
Survey data suggests that the issue of legislative salary can still be linked to ideological 
preferences.   After annual sessions became a reality in Oregon, legislators voted for modest 
increases in salaries as well as an increase in   Legislator salary is often a tough issue for 
                                                     
54 “Senate Joint Resolution 41” <http://gov.oregonlive.com/bill/2010/SJR41/>  Accessed March 14, 2014 
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legislators as it carries with it a lot of political baggage – politicians who vote to raise their own 
salaries run the risk of negative reactions come election time. This survey seemed to be the ideal 
time to gain insight into legislator viewpoints being influenced by considerations of reelection 
campaigns. The survey question given asked legislators to first think about the amount time they 
commit to their responsibilities as a legislator and then decide if their monetary compensation 
was commiserate with their workload. With this in mind, none of the participating legislators feel 
that their own salaries are too high; however, a fair number of Conservative legislators think of 
their salary as being “just right.” A strong majority (79.3 percent) feel that their salary is too low.  
Considering party affiliation, ideology and district composition, the trend for those content with 
the compensation is clear: Conservative Republicans from rural districts are satisfied with 
current levels of compensation while Democrats, both liberal and moderate, would like to see an 
increase in Legislator salary. Associated with salary is the amount of resources given to each 
legislator to hire staff and supply their offices.   
Ideology vs Staffing Levels  
Previous calculations of legislature staffing levels have focused only on the total staff 
employee by the legislature and then divides that by number of legislators in a given state. This 
all-encompassing number includes both the partisan staff employed by legislative offices as well 
as non-partisan committee, fiscal and budget, and legal staff. Legislators utilize non-partisan 
staff for writing bills and parsing the fiscal and budgetary outcomes of legislation, yet have little 
direct control over their management. In parsing the effect partisanship has on the 
professionalization process, I therefore was largely uninterested in nonpartisan staff and was 
more directly concerned with how legislators staffed their own offices. When looking at the level 
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of partisan staff each member employs annually a slight differentiation between urban liberal 
Democrats and rural conservative Republicans in Oregon emerges. 
[Table Five about here] 
According to the survey data, (see table five), Democrats are slightly more inclined hire 
individual part time staff while Republicans are more likely to share their staff between offices.  
Regardless of party affiliation most every member of the Oregon legislature hires one full-time 
partisan staff member. The major split between the parties is over part-time staff vs. shared staff.  
A near unanimous majority of Democrats admitted to hiring at least one part-time staff member, 
presumably for when they legislature is in session and workloads are increased. Just over fifty 
percent of republicans also hire part-time staff, yet four out of nine also conceded to sharing staff 
between other member offices. Based on the data, is does appear the Democrats are slightly more 
inclined to staff their offices at slightly higher levels. Another explanation could be that 
Republicans employ a smaller pool of people than Democrats and share them between their 
offices. Effectively this would make a “shared” staff member full time in terms of the number of 
hours work per week. These “shared” full time staffers would then split their work between 
offices as needed.  Such a phenomena is not absent from Democratic members. The data merely 
suggests it is much more common among Republicans. Another way to look at the Table 5 data 
is to assign numerical values for each type of staff member employed annually.  
To make the comparison of Table 5 more clear the following formula was devised to calculate in 
numerical terms the number of annual partisan staff employed by each member:  
 ((Full Time Staff *1) + (Part Time Staff *.5) + (Shared Staff *.25)) / Number of Respondents 
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Full time staff work year round, so a value of 1 was the obvious choice. In Oregon, part 
time staff are often either 6 month hires for the legislative session or work only part time55 
throughout the year, therefore a value of .5 was applied.  Finally, shared staff are only valued at 
.25 because their workload is spread around between various member offices. Even if shared 
staff ultimately work full time, each member who shares in their employment only utilizes their 
support for a limited duration, and likely not throughout the entire year. The results of these 
calculations are shown on Table Six. 
[Table Six about here] 
 This data more clearly supports the assertion that Democrats staff their offices as slightly 
higher levels than do their Republican counterparts. Moreover, liberals and those in urban areas 
are also more likely to have incrementally larger staff than conservatives or members from rural 
districts.  Considering not only staffing levels but also session length and legislative salary, the 
survey data gathered from Oregon legislators strongly indicates a relationship between 
partisanship and levels of professionalization. Having established tentative connections between 
partisanship and three main factors which contribute to the Squire Index. However, political 
party and ideology proved not to be explanatory factors when it comes to legislator preferences 
surrounding the issue of employee staff over the long term vs. hiring new staff every few years.   
Section Three: Data Analysis 
A tentative relationship has been established between ideology and the main three 
ingredients of the Squire Index. I now turn back to Squire to see if the implications of this study 
can shed any light on explaining the outliers created by Squire’s measurement. If ideology has a 
measurable impact on formation on legislator salary, session length, and staffing Squire’s index 
                                                     
55 Less than 30 hours per week 
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should reflect that with historically conservative, republican dominated states receiving lower 
scores than their historically liberal, democratic counterparts. Additionally Fiorina was not 
wrong to assert that such a relationship exists, he was just mistaken to assume that the effects 
professionalization would have exponential impact on partisanship over time.  
Ideology and Squire  
State GDP remains be the most consistent indicator of professionalization, however, the 
preliminary results of this study indicate large variations between states with similar GDPs may, 
in fact, be the result of the partisan differences between those states. Squire is strongly of the 
opinion of the opinion that State Wealth is the best explanatory factory in explaining State 
Professionalism. The data collected through my research has not disproven that theory. My 
assertion is that the GDP model is largely incomplete without accounting for the ideological 
preferences. Figure four displays the data from Figure one.56 The data was then color coded57 
with blue representing states that have been controlled by Democrats and red for states controlled 
by Republicans.58   
[Figure four about here] 
Republican states, like their Democratic counterparts, do exhibit an uptick in 
professionalization score as GDP increases but only to a certain point. Consistently Republican 
states Florida and Texas rank substantially lower on the Squire Index than one would think 
considering their size of their GDP. Distinguishing features of both Texas and Florida is that they 
both hold shorter sessions than more professional legislatures. In 2003, annual legislator salary in 
                                                     
56 See Page 14 
57 State party alignment was determined by examining party control of state legislators from 1992-2010. States were considered to be blue or red 
when the Democrats or Republicans held both house of the legislature for 60% of that time period. States not falling into either category were left 
out of consideration. Those states are as follows: Alaska, Kentucky, Indiana, Virginia, Nevada, Michigan, and Wisconsin.  
58 “State Party Control.” NCLS Website.  <http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/legislative-session-length.aspxv>. Accessed 
5/04/2014. 
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Florida was $27,000 annually and in Texas it was only $7,200. Compare this to New York where 
in 2003 legislators were compensated with $79,000 annually and there are no limits on session 
length. Republican states were moderately supportive of some aspects of professionalization; the 
data indicates that politics plays some role in determining to what extent reforms are adopted. 
Republicans may support some measures of Professionalization, but only to a certain point. 
 One major weakness of figure one is that it fails to take into account ideological differences 
between the States. Democrats in the south are known to be much more conservative than their 
northern or western counterparts.  The same analysis used with figure four can be conducted 
using party ideology rankings59 for each state.  
[Figure five about here] 
Looking at the Squire Index in terms of ideology provides an even clearer picture of the 
general influence ideology may have on state politics. Within political parties regional 
ideological variations are commonplace. While Democrats historically have held majorities in 
several southern states they are also remarkably more conservative. Recent elections60 have seen 
democrats lose their majorities in states such as Arkansas, Mississippi and Alabama.  While 
party control has changed frequently in some states, the median ideology of the two parties is 
much more static. Recently Boris Shor and Nolan McCarty mapped the ideology of state 
legislatures61States with a majority of legislatures leaning conservative can be grouped together 
and compared to the states where a majority of legislators lean liberal. Using the Shor/McCarty 
data62 I grouped the states on figure 5 into three categories based on their ideological score: 
Liberal (blue), conservative (red), and Moderate (black). California’s data was used in 
                                                     
59 Shor, Borris; McCarty, Nolan. “The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures.”  American Politican science Review (August 2011), 
105:3, pp 530-551.  
 
60 Particularly 2010 and 2012.  
61 Shore (2011).  
62 Ibid 
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calculating the trend line but the data point is not pictured. Looking at figure five, the trend lies 
indicate that states where liberals control the legislature have a propensity to score higher on the 
Squire Index than conservative controlled ones with similar GDPs.  The relative wealth of a state 
remains a major factor behind professionalization; however, the main components of the Squire 
Index are not the direct result of GDP.  The level of staff support, length of legislative session, 
and legislator salaries are all policy decisions made at some point or another by a given 
legislature. A high GDP in New York may have contributed to the legislature decided to pass 
reforms to increase session length or staff resources, but ultimately it was the policy choice of 
New York to pass such reforms. Conversely it is the policy choice of less professional, 
conservative states such as Texas or Florida, to not to institute such changes, or at least to pass 
more modest versions of reform.   Having demonstrated how the Squire Index may be 
understood better through the lens of ideology, the 1994 Fiorina article should be re-examined.  
Implications of Ideology:  
Fiorina’s article pointed out that while individual events in professionalization may have 
created positive outcomes from Democrats, those trends produced little to no gain over time. 
Fiorina quite astutely pointed out that following the move in the State of Ohio toward annual 
sessions democrats were able to pick up large seat gains in an otherwise strong Republican 
election year of 1972.  It would be illogical to assume, however, that this effect would last more 
than a single election or two. The effect of annual sessions was not so powerful such that it 
would cause a continuous gain of Democratic seats. At a certain point, the effect would plateau.  
Despite theoretical reservations about time commitment and the increases in session length, 
enough Republicans would still serve in the legislature. Certainly the professionalization of 
Congress has not kept ideologically conservative members from holding office, despite their 
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potential objections to an increase in the size of government.  The case of Oregon has illustrated 
ideology can play a role in several key areas of professionalism.  
The survey data from Oregon demonstrates a measurable ideological impact on the 
propensity of a given legislator to support expanded session length as well as increased staffing 
levels.  Urban liberals, on average, staff their offices at an incrementally higher rate than their 
rural conservative counterparts. Moreover, liberals universally support reforms expanding 
legislative session length while conservative remain split on the issue. Applying these concepts 
to other states might help explain differences in professionalization levels among states with 
similar populations and economies. The effects of partisanship can also be used to explain past 
changes in professionalization as well. Some scholars63 have pointed to the influx of urban 
liberals following the Supreme Court Cases of Barker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims as the 
foundation of the professionalization movement.   
The effects of Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims had inherently partisan consequences. 
Both of these cases dealt with the issue of how states were to design their legislative district, and 
have been referenced by many scholars as the beginning of the professionalization movement at 
the state level. Prior to this, many senators and representatives were elected by county, without 
regard to the fact that some urban counties were vastly more populous than rural ones. Rural 
citizens, therefore, had far greater representation in state legislatures than did those living in 
cities. Reynolds v. Sims established what is known colloquially as the “one person, one vote” 
precedent, meaning that no individual should be more represented in the legislature than any 
other individual. This ushered in a large contingent of new legislators from urban areas, which is 
                                                     
63 Pound, William. “State Legislative Careers, Twenty-Five Years of Reform,” in Changing Patterns in State Legislative Careers, ed. Gary 
Moncrief et al. (University of Michigan Press, 1992). pp 9-22.  
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to say liberal democrats were huge beneficiaries of this change. This has led some scholars64 to 
these court cases as the birth of legislative professionalism. If it can be said that legislative 
professionalism was born out of ideology, then it illogical to assume that ideology does not hold 
some weight in influencing relative levels of professionalization in various states.  
Study Limitations and Future Directions 
 
Case studies will always have the problem of not being more broadly applicable, despite 
the similarities between the subject and other related cases. I will continue to defend the assertion 
Oregon makes a solid case worth studying. The aforementioned work of Yin, (1984), also lends 
validity to this study. The recent switch to annual sessions is something most states had 
accomplished, at least some extent, thirty years prior.   Moving forward further survey data 
should be gathered comparing the ideological preferences of state legislators with the choices 
they make when it comes to staffing, salary increases, and other reforms in professionalization. 
As ideology varies within political parties across the country, the political party affiliation should 
not be expected to be very predictive of professionalization levels. Ideology, at least in the case 
of Oregon, proved to be extremely effective in explaining the switch to annual sessions.  
However, before any major conclusions may be drawn outside of Oregon, further research is 
needed examining this trend.  
One possible line of inquiry could take the form of a comparative study between states 
with similar GDP yet fairly different professionalization scores.  The previously mentioned split 
between a generally conservative Texas and the more liberal New York would be a great place to 
start. If the Oregon data is predictive of anything, one could easily conclude that New York 
                                                     
64 See Pound (1992) also Karl Kurtz (1974) “Legislative Organization and Services” in Book of the States (1974-1975). 
<http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/bos_1974_2.pdf> Accessed May 31, 2014 
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professionalized due to a generally broader ideological acceptance of an enlarged role for 
government. Texas, on the other hand, resisted reforms as a reflection of the more conservative 
legislator’s beliefs in limiting the size of government and support for the private sector. A split 
would also be expected along rural/urban lines, with those members from rural areas of Texas 
and New York being generally more opposed to a state legislature that more resembles congress.    
Conclusion:  
 As legislatures continue evolve, it is important to continuously test previous conclusions and 
experiment with explanations, such as ideology, as possible factors that may contribute to those 
evolutions. The ever changing state legislatures should be viewed as laboratories in which 
consistent and rigorous experiments can be conducted. The Squire Index is only one measure by 
which legislatures can be compared on the macro level. The data gathered in this study 
demonstrates that individual reforms can be highly influenced by ideological preferences. While 
scholars have debated the various measurements and causes of professionalization legislators 
have also taken notice of these changes. Legislators should not be looked at as somehow separate 
from the equation of professionalization. Rather they are active participants in both its 
advancement in as well as in other cases the barrier to its development. Their views, which are 
inherently partisan, shape the ways state government function and can have a noticeable impact 
on the extent to which a given legislature may professionalize.  
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Tables 
 
State Squire Index (2003)65 
California .626 
Michigan .342 
Texas .199 
Oregon .159 
New Hampshire .027 
 
 
                                                     
65 Peverill Squire. State Legislatures Today: Politics Under the Domes. Ed. Gary Moncreif. Pearson Education, Inc. (2010): p 87.  
Table Two   Liberal  Moderate Conservative 
Democrats: 10 8 0 
Republicans: 0 1 8 
       
  Urban Mix Rural 
Democrats: 12 6 1 
Republicans: 0 2 7 
    
Table One: 
Sample of State rankings from Squire Index 
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Table Three The change to annual sessions was:   
  Unnecessary Necessary Still not Long Enough 
Democrats 1 15 3 
Republicans 5 4 0 
  Unnecessary Necessary Still not Long Enough 
Liberal 0 7 3 
Moderate 1 6 0 
Conservative 5 3 0 
  Unnecessary Necessary Still not Long Enough 
Urban 1 8 2 
Mix 0 6 1 
Rural 5 2 0 
Table Four Legislator Salary in Oregon is:    
  Too Low Just Right Too High 
Democrats 20 0 0 
Republicans 3 6 0 
  Too Low Just Right Too High 
Liberal 10 0 0 
Moderate 9 0 0 
Conservative 3 6 0 
  Too Low Just Right Too High 
Urban 12 0 0 
Mix 9 0 0 
Rural 2 6 0 
35 
 
 Table Five: Number of Staff employed annually:    
 Full Time Part Time Shared 
Totals: 27 25 6 
  Full Time Part Time Shared 
Democrats 19 20 2 
Republicans 7 5 4 
  Full Time Part Time Shared 
Liberal 10 11 0 
Moderate 8 7 3 
Conservative 6 5 3 
  Full Time Part Time Shared 
Urban 12 12 1 
Mix 9 7 0 
Rural 5 4 5 
 
Table Six: Annual Staff Per Legislator 
Democrats 1.48 
Republicans 1.17 
    
Liberal 1.55 
Moderate 1.36 
Conservative 1.16 
    
Urban 1.52 
Mix 1.39 
Rural 1.03 
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Appendix B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Red: Professional Legislatures; White Semi-Professional Legislatures ; Blue: Citizen Based Legislatures 
 
Time on Job, Average Pay, and Average Staff by category of Legislature 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: “Full-and Part-Time Legislatures.” NCSL Website. http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-time-     
 legislatures.aspx. Accessed March 11 2014.  
Red Red Light White Blue Light Blue 
California 
Michigan 
New York 
Pennsylvania 
Illinois 
Florida 
Ohio 
Massachusetts 
New Jersey 
Wisconsin 
Alabama 
Alaska 
Arizona 
Arkansas 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Hawaii 
Iowa 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Maryland 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
North 
Carolina 
Oklahoma 
Oregon 
South 
Carolina 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Virginia 
Washington 
Georgia 
Idaho 
Indiana 
Kansas 
Maine 
Mississippi 
Nevada 
New 
Mexico 
Rhode 
Island 
Vermont 
West 
Virginia 
Montana 
New 
Hampshire 
North 
Dakota 
South 
Dakota 
Utah 
Wyoming 
Category of Legislature Time on the Job 
(1) 
Compensation 
(2) 
Staff per 
Member (3) 
Red 80% $68,599 8.9 
White 70% $35,326 3.1 
Blue 54% $15,984 1.2 
Notes: 
1. Estimated proportion of a full-time job spent on legislative work including 
time in session, constituent service, interim committee work, and election 
campaigns. 
2. Estimated average annual compensation of legislators including salary, per 
diem, and any other unvouchered expense payments. 
3. Ratio of total legislative staff to number of legislators. This includes central 
legislative staff offices, so it is not a measure of how many staff work directly 
for each legislator. 
41 
 
Appendix C 
 
Thank you for choosing to participate in this survey. By participating, you agree to have 
your answers complied and published in the form of survey data.  Individual answers will not 
be published or made public.  
 
Background Information:  
 
In the 1950s state legislatures looked amateurish in comparison to Congress - legislators on the 
state level were understaffed, underpaid, and only were in session a few months per year. Political 
Scientist Alexander Heard described the state legislature of the mid-twentieth century as institutionally 
“poorly organized; technically ill-equipped; functioning with inadequate time, staff, and space; and 
operating with outmoded procedures and committee systems”66 However, over the past fifty years, a 
reform movement to transform state legislatures into a more Congress-like body occurred. Scholars have 
labeled this movement the process of "professionalization."  
 
Legislative professionalism can be generally defined as the movement of State Legislatures to the 
same level of organizational support as Congress. This means “providing State Legislatures with adequate 
resources to do their jobs in a manner comparable to Congress” Adequate resources include, but are not 
limited to, “expanded legislative sessions, superior staff resources, and sufficient pay to allow members to 
peruse legislative service as their vocation.”  
 
Professionalization in Oregon: 
 
The history of the professionalization of Oregon’s legislature is similar to that of many other 
states. Oregon’s most major effort to modernize its legislature was in 1967, when the legislature "created 
an advisory committee to study and recommend reforms.” In 1968, the committee’s report was issued and 
the state legislature chose to adopt some, but not all of the recommended reforms. Following national 
trends, initial reforms included “increased legislators’ pay, removed constitutional restrictions on session 
lengths, and hired more staff.” The expanded session length and additional staff was meant to increase 
institutional professionalism by giving legislators the professional support they needed to do their jobs. 
The increase in salary worked to make the position of “legislator” more financially viable as permanent 
vocation. Further reforms came in the late 1970's and early 1980's, when a 12.5 million dollar renovation 
of the Oregon Capitol building "added further space for legislative offices, hearing rooms, support 
services, a first floor galleria, and underground parking."67 Additionally resources were made available 
for full time staff to assist legislators in their duties. This phenomenon in Oregon did not stop with the 
changes of the 60’s, 70’s and 80’s. It remains an ongoing process in all fifty states today.  
 
Purpose of this Survey:  
 
 The main function is to ascertain how legislators and their staff perceive the changes that have 
taken place in the Oregon State Legislature over the past 50 years. As legislatures continue to modernize 
their institutions and behavior, it continues to be important to research and track these changes.  
 
                                                     
66 Alan Rosenthal, Engines of Democracy: Politics & Policymaking in State Legislatures, (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), 183-184 
67 Oregon Legislature Website. http://www.leg.state.or.us/capinfo/legislative_history.pdf  
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Appendix D 
 
Survey 
 
1. What is your party affiliation?  
a) Democratic  b) Republican  c) Other d) Prefer not to say 
 
2. Ideologically, do you generally consider yourself to be:  
 
a) Libertarian   b) Conservative  c) Liberal d) Socialist/Social Democrat 
e) Moderate  f) Prefer not to say 
3) I consider my primary occupation to be: (Please Check One) 
 
 Full-Time Legislator  Communications 
 Attorney  Medical Professional  
 Business: Owner  Music/Arts 
 Business: Executive/Manager  Government Employee: Local 
 Business: Non-Manager  Government Employee: State 
 Agriculture  Homemaker 
 Retired  Engineer/Scientist/Architect 
 Educator: K-12  Clergy 
 Educator: College  Labor Union 
 Consultant/Professional/Non-Profit  Student 
 Real Estate  Insurance 
 
4) How many years have you held public office? (As a legislator) 
 
a) Under 2 years      b) 2-5 years        c) 5-10 years          d) 10-15 years         e) 15+ years 
 
5) In thinking about the district you represent, do you consider it to be:  
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a) Mostly Urban  b) Mostly Rural            c) A mix of Rural and Urban  
 
6) Salaries (including per-diem pay) of State Legislators in Oregon are ___________ 
a) Too High   b) Just right  c) Too low 
7) If your financial compensation as a legislator were to be adequately comparable with the 
compensation of your occupation outside the legislature, would you consider being a legislator as a 
full time occupation? (ie, would you leave your job outside the legislature to focus on your 
responsibilities within the legislature).  
a) Yes          b) No 
 
c) Being a legislator is already my full time vocation / I am retired outside the legislature 
 
8) While IN session, my duties as a State Legislator require ___________ hours of my time per 
week. 
a) 0-10  b) 10-20 c) 20-30 d) 30-40 e) 40+ 
 
9) While NOT in session, my duties as a State Legislator requires ___________ hours of my time 
per week. (This includes Leg Days, Constituent Work, and any other duties related to the 
legislature) 
a) 0-10  b) 10-20 c) 20-30 d) 30-40 e) 40+ 
 
10) The move to annual legislative sessions, (one long session, one short session), in Oregon was 
____________ 
a) A necessary change  b) An unnecessary change c) Indifferent 
D) Didn’t go far enough, full sessions should be held annually  
 
11)  How many staff does your office employ annually? (Please provide a number, your office staff 
does not include committee staff) 
______ Full Time (Year Round) ______ Part Time (Session) 
 ______ Shared Staff (Between your and other legislator’s offices) 
 
12) If additional resources were to be allocated for staffing in the capitol, I would advocate that 
they be directed toward salary increases and/or additional staffing for: (Circle all that apply) 
a) Legislator Office Staff (Partisan)  b) Caucus Staff (Partisan)  
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c)   Committee Staff (Non-Partisan)   d) Legislative Council / Fiscal Revenue Staff 
  
e) Legislator Salaries    f)   Staffing levels are currently adequate 
 
 13) If additional resources were allocated for legislative offices I would:  
a) Increase Staffing levels (hire more staff)  b) Increase current staff salaries 
 
c)   Invest in new office equipment/supplies   d) A combination of A, B, and C 
  
 e)   My office is adequately staffed and supplied.  
 
14)  Given the option I would prefer my office staff:  
a) Remain in my employment as long as possible.  More experienced staff helps my office run 
more effectively.  
b) Remain in my employment over several sessions, but new staff can easily be hired and 
trained  
c) Remain mostly part time, temporary positions.  I rely mostly on committee, legislative 
council, fiscal and revenue, and/or caucus staff for the majority of my support as a legislator.  
 
Thank you for choosing to participate in this survey. Again, your answers will be kept anonymous. The 
results of my research will be published this summer and available online. It is my hope that it will provide 
useful insight into the “state of the legislature,” and my findings will serve to highlight ways in which the 
legislature can better serve the citizens of the State of Oregon.   
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